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D.R.O.
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Date 21/1/71

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368
FILE No. NEJ 3/548/1 (Part 25)

TITLE: Political relations between U.K.
and Jordan

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C.W.L.	(5)	15/6	Regy		2/6			
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PART

FILE No. NEJ 3/548/1

YEAR
STAMP
1970

USEFUL INFORMATION RELATED TO CONTENTS OF THIS FILE

TRANSFERS:

⑤ TO NET 3/322/1

⑨+⑩ TO NET 22/7

②①+②② TO NET 3/408/1

LAST FILE: NET 3/548/1 (1968-9)

NEXT FILE: NET 3/548/1 (1971)

OTHER RELATED FILES:

N.F.

Pl eter am 20/4

(L)

NNNNX
BC B

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10
NEJ 21

3/598/1

B1 U.S. AMBASSADOR: HUSSEIN'S DECISION, SAYS 'AL-AHRAM'

(MON. SERVICE NOTE: FOR INFORMATION ONLY: NOT TO BE ATTRIBUTED TO
M.E.N.A.)

(MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY) CAIRO: 'AL-AHRAM' REPORTS IN ITS 19TH
APRIL ISSUE IN A DISPATCH FROM AMMAN THAT KING HUSSEIN PERSONALLY
TOOK THE DECISION OF DISMISSING (ARABIC: TARD) THE U.S. AMBASSADOR
TO JORDAN AND ASKED DEPUTY PREMIER AND FOREIGN MINISTER AL-RIFAI
TO NOTIFY THE U.S. GOVERNMENT TO THE EFFECT THAT THE AMBASSADOR IS
PERSONA NON GRATA.

'AL-AHRAM' ADDS THAT THE KING TOOK THIS DECISION DURING A
MEETING OVER WHICH HE PRESIDED AND WHICH WAS ATTENDED BY SEVERAL
MINISTERS, SENIOR OFFICERS AND A NUMBER OF POLITICAL PERSONALITIES.

MF BBC MON 0045 19/4 JW (KY)

X X

B1 AMBASSADOR 2: TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

ANTI-U.S. DEMONSTRATIONS SWEEPED THE JORDANIAN CAPITAL
LAST WEDNESDAY. DURING THESE DEMONSTRATIONS DEMONSTRATORS
ATTACKED THE U.S. EMBASSY AND LOWERED THE U.S. FLAG AND BURNED
THE U.S. INFORMATION CENTRE.

'AL-AHRAM' EXPLAINS THAT THE KING WAS NOTIFIED DURING THE
MEETING THAT AMBASSADOR HARRISON SYMMES WANTED TO TALK TO HIM
ON THE PHONE. THE KING ASKED THAT THE LINE BE CONNECTED
DURING THE MEETING. AMBASSADOR SYMMES TALKED TO THE KING EXCITEDLY
(BINFIAL). THE KING IMMEDIATELY DECIDED TO REMOVE (IBAD) THE
AMBASSADOR AND ASKED AL-RIFAI, WHO WAS PRESENT AT THE MEETING,
TO TAKE THE MEASURES TO IMPLEMENT THE DECISION.

END BBC MON 0050 19/4 JW (KY) (TVN)

(i) Mr Evans R.E. 20/4 RESTRICTED

(ii) Copy Mr M.E. Howell,
Parliamentary Clerk



(iii) enter

(iv) Mr Long - 12

and make recommendations British Embassy,
20/4 AMMAN.

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10
NEJ 3/548/1

6/6

18/11

15 April, 1970.

Dear Christopher,

Reth

8/5


Jordan : New Parliament Building.

As you may know, a new building is being constructed for the Jordanian Parliament, to replace the cramped and dingy structure in which that body currently meets. Part of the new buildings - mainly offices for the secretariat - are already in use. The library will be completed next year, and the meeting rooms, committee rooms, restaurant and cafeteria in two year's time.

2. The British Council, which has been asked to advise on the provision of books for the library, are considering donating a gift of books from their own funds. Would some other gift from HMG to mark the opening of the new building be appropriate? I am not, unfortunately, acquainted with the precedents and cannot really advise on the size or cost of such a gift, though, for what its worth, the sort of thing that occurred to me was the furnishings of one of the committee rooms. Two possible sources for such a gift occur to me - the overseas section of the House of Commons, and the F.C.O. Miscellaneous Assistance Scheme. Perhaps the former would be in the best position to advise as to whether a gift on the opening of a new Parliament building would be normal, and on the sort of gift that would be appropriate.

|| 3. We should be interested to learn the reactions to this proposal at your end.

Yours ever,


(C. P. Carter)

C. W. Long, Esq.,
Near Eastern Department,
F.C.O.,
LONDON, S.W.1.

RESTRICTED

Mr. Long

5/5

On the Miscellaneous Assistance side, we ought to make it quite clear to the post that we cannot commit funds too far ahead. Furnishing a lounge for the U.S.S. building in Kuala Lumpur is going to cost us \$2,500, or \$2,000-\$1,500 and not go all that far toward furnishing a committee room in Amman. I have a suggested amendment to cover these two points.

I have discussed the Protocol gift question with Miss Giltz. Protocol gifts are more likely to cost less than \$500, so could not be larger than under the Miscellaneous Assistance scheme. While we could not provide a gift under the U.S.S. if it was required chiefly because of a special representative's visit, there would be no objection to a Miscellaneous Assistance gift in its own right being presented by a visiting special rep. instead of by the resident Ambassador. We suggest therefore that you call reference to protocol gifts, at any rate at this stage.

J. Plater

(-125) (J. Plater)
(Minister of State)
1 May, 1970

P
8/5

RESTRICTED



(NEJ.3/548)

Near Eastern Department,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London S.W.1

8 May, 1970

P. am
15/5

Gift to New Jordan Parliament

Thank you for your letter 18/11 of 15 April.

2. I am afraid that a gift from the House of Commons would at present be difficult to arrange, because it would be bound to run into controversy inside the House. You probably saw an article in the 'Spectator' some weeks ago by A. P. Roth, describing how the Arab/Israeli dispute has caused bitterness between members even on the same side of the House.
3. A gift from the Miscellaneous Assistance Scheme might however be possible, since your proposal seems to meet the usual criteria of the scheme. We have no particular doctrine on what form a gift should take: we must leave it to you to propose what would be most appropriate. Between £500 and £1,000 may be available, although the higher figure would be a large slice of our allocation for the whole Mediterranean and Middle East area. Items of furniture might be suitable, but we have found in the past that structural fittings can cause considerable administrative problems, and it is very unlikely that we could afford to furnish a whole room. You should not, of course, speak to the Jordanians about the idea in a way which implied that we are as yet committed to making a gift.
4. From your letter it appears that the gift might not be due until at least financial year 1971/72. I should be grateful for more comments on the precise timing, since we cannot commit Miscellaneous Assistance funds so far ahead even in principle.
5. Do the Jordanians intend to arrange a full-scale formal inauguration of the new building? Are they likely to want to invite a special guest from here?

(C. W. Long)

C. P. Carter Esq.,
AMMAN

RESTRICTED

COL 1 10



10 Downing Street
Whitehall

June 21, 1970.

Dear Jimmy,

I enclose 8 messages of congratulations to the Prime Minister with draft replies. Provided no objection is seen I should be grateful if you would arrange for despatch of the replies.

I would draw particular attention to the messages to the Rulers of Abu Dhabi and Bahrain. In view of the political circumstances you may wish to consider whether the last sentences of these two messages would be better omitted or reworded in some way. I should be glad to have your view on this since there may be other messages in this category.

In addition to the messages to which draft answers are attached, there is one further message from E. M. Al Hadidi of Abu Dhabi whom I have not been able to identify immediately. I should be grateful if you could send a suitable reply to this message also.

Yours sincerely

Peter Moon

J. A. N. Graham, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

NED

We will be receiving a large number of messages of congratulation to the Prime Minister. Where these are fairly straight forward No. 10 provide a reply which can be sent off without further consultation with them. That reply will be passed to you and you should then draft a telegram along the following lines:

"The Prime Minister has received the following message from the Prime Minister of Begins:

Ends.

I would be grateful if you would pass the following reply to from the Prime Minister. Begins:

Ends!"

2. Before despatching the reply please check to see that it has been drafted in the appropriate terms for the recipient. If you wish to suggest a redraft of the message please submit to the Private Office.


I.M.C.

(I. McCluney)
22 June, 1970.

W ⑥

MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO KING HUSSEIN
OF JORDAN

I am most grateful for Your Majesty's
very kind message of congratulations and good
wishes. Please accept my warm thanks.



Telegram sent
at 1900 hrs.

Pl. enter cum
22/6

for cum
25/6

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 10

NEJ3/548/1

(7)

EN CLAIR

IMMEDIATE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 194

TO AMMAN
22 JUNE 1970
(HED)

pm
25/1

UNCLASSIFIED.

THE PRIME MINISTER HAS RECEIVED THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN. BEGINS: THE RIGHT HONOURABLE EDWARD HEATH, PRIME MINISTER, 13 DOWNING STREET, LONDON. I WAS DELIGHTED TO LEARN OF THE VICTORY OF THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY. I AM CONFIDENT THAT THE FAITH AND TRUST OF THE BRITISH PEOPLE IS MORE THAN WELL PLACED. IN YOU THE BRITISH PEOPLE HAVE CHOSEN A TALENTED LEADER WHO WILL GUIDE AND INSPIRE THEM TO VERY GREAT HEIGHTS. PLEASE ACCEPT MY SINCERE AND HEARTFELT FELICITATIONS. WITH MY BEST WISHES AND WELL DONE. YOUR FRIEND HUSSEIN. ENDS.

2. I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD PASS THE FOLLOWING REPLY TO KING HUSSEIN FROM THE PRIME MINISTER. BEGINS: I AM MOST GRATEFUL FOR YOUR MAJESTY'S VERY KIND MESSAGE OF CONGRATULATIONS AND GOOD WISHES. PLEASE ACCEPT MY WARM THANKS. ENDS.


DOUGLAS-HOME

[COPIES SENT TO PRIVATE SECRETARY NO.10 DOWNING ST]

FILES

N.E.D.
PRIVATE OFFICE
P.S. TO P.U.S.

~~CLASSIFIED~~



RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY NO. 10
30 JUN 1970

NEJ3/548/1

BRITISH EMBASSY,

AMMAN.

June, 1970

(8)

Dear Peter,


f (9) — In accordance with the instructions contained in our telegram No. 184 of 22 June, I was of the Prime Minister's reply to King Hussein's message of greetings when I was received in audience on 24 June. His Majesty expressed delight.

Yours ever.

Philip

(Philip Adams)

J.P. Tripp, Esq.,
Near Eastern Department,
Foreign and Commonwealth
Office.



RESTRICTED

2/15

NEJ
Ever.

(11)
More for you than
us, I think.

BRITISH EMBASSY,
KUWAIT.

5 October, 1970.

fl
15/10.

pr
un
20/10

Dear Department,

--- We enclose a copy of the front page of As-Siyasa of
27 September purporting to carry facsimiles of correspondence
--- between the Jordanian Minister of Foreign Affairs and the
Jordanian Embassy in London. We also enclose a translation
of the ~~alleged~~ letter which refers to a British grant of
KD300,000 for subversion in Syria.

2. Both you and the Chancery in Amman may wish to be aware
of the publication of these alleged documents. We here have
of course no means of checking their authenticity.

Yours ever,


Chancery.

Arabian Department,
Foreign & Commonwealth Office.

c.c. Chancery, Amman.

NEJ 3/548/1

RESTRICTED



Unclassified

TRANSLATION

"TOP SECRET"

No.75/50/24111

Date: 4/10/1967.

TO: H.E. The Jordanian Ambassador,
London.

With reference to your letter No.27/J/172 dated 1/10/1967 I would like to advise you that the letter has been submitted to H.M. The King and has issued his directive on the following:-

1. Carry out urgent discussions with the British Foreign Secretary regarding the Jordanian Government's approval of carrying out direct negotiations with the Israeli authorities.
2. Advise the British Government of her approval of President Tito's plan.
3. Advise the British Government that the Jordanian Government neither approves of nor supports the Syrian Government's inflexible policy towards the solution of the Middle East problem and considers that the policy of Syrian rulers is a wrong one.
4. Carry out urgent contacts with the British authorities regarding the grant to Jordan of a sum of 300 thousand Dinars in order to coordinate the military cooperation with the Lebanese authorities for encouraging the Syrian officers to expedite their armed revolution against the Baathist rule in Syria.

Signed

Jordanian Minister of Foreign
Affairs.

Copy to:

BRITISH EMBASSY,
KUWAIT.

RESTRICTED

2/15

5 October, 1970.

Dear Department,

--- We enclose a copy of the front page of al-Nayasa of
27 September purporting to carry facsimiles of correspondence
--- between the Jordanian Minister of Foreign Affairs and the
Jordanian Embassy in London. We also enclose a translation
of the alleged letter which refers to a British grant of
£1,300,000 for subversion in Syria.

1. Both you and the Chancery in Amman may wish to be aware
of the publication of these alleged documents. We here have
of course no means of checking their authenticity.

Yours over,

Chancery.

Arabian Department,
Foreign & Commonwealth Office.


c.c. Chancery, Amman.

RESTRICTED

Folios 9, 10

transferred to Net

22/7



With the compliments of

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH
OFFICE

LONDON, S.W.1

CONFIDENTIAL

12

NEJ 3/548/1

Mr. Evans

Political future of Jordan and Anglo-Jordanian Relations

I submit a list of points which might be used in discussion on Monday, 26 October. The list takes into account Mr. Phillips' despatch 1/1 of 15 October just received, of which you have a copy.

C.W. Long

(C.W. Long)
Near Eastern Department

25 October, 1970

Mr. Long 27/10
Encl.

Many thanks.

R.E. 26/10

for
28/10

Copy to:

Sir P. Adams

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

The political future of Jordan and Anglo-Jordanian political relations

1. King Hussein's position

Will to govern: support among the Army, East Bankers and Palestinians.
Alternative rulers.

2. The Fedayeen

Capabilities. Possibility of recovery after the recent fighting.
Support and sources of finance. Possibilities of influence and control.
Their ambitions. Relations with the Army.

3. The Jordan Arab Army

Organisation, composition, strength, political tendencies. Likely
command changes. Relations with the fedayeen and the population at large.

4. The Government

Composition of present government, and likely successors. Palestinian
participation, and new blood. Constitutional advance.

5. Jordan/Arab relations

Death of President Nasser. Unpopularity of King Hussein on the West
Bank and elsewhere. Relations with Iraq and Syria, and withdrawal of Iraqi
troops. Khartoum and prospects for its continuance. Jordanian attitudes
to a settlement.

6. HMG's relations with King Hussein

Effects of recent events upon these relations: likely developments.

7. Military Relations

Military training: Defence Attachés' work: supply of ammunition
and military equipment: contacts with the Jordanian Army. (Arms supplies
also to be dealt with separately on 27 October).


8. Miscellaneous

British community; Commercial and other visits; BBC; economic and
commercial prospects.

9. The Future

Guidelines for future UK policy towards Jordan and for the work of
HM Embassy, Amman. Possibilities for hedging bets. "Low profile".

CONFIDENTIAL



HOUSE OF COMMONS
LONDON, SW1

September 28th, 1970

The Rt. Hon. Sir A. F. Douglas-Home, K.T., M.P.,
Secretary of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs,
Downing Street, S.W.1.

Dear Sir Alec

I notice that you have been burdened by a telegram
from the Camden Borough Communist Party. I thought you
might like to see a copy of my letter to them.

Sincerely
Geoffrey Finsberg

GEOFFREY FINSBERG

enc.

✓ 5/10

NED

on Mr. Godwin

9/10.

Geoffrey Finsberg, M.B.E., J.P., M.P. (Hampstead)

Copy: /The Rt. Hon. Sir A.F. Douglas-Home, K.T., M.P.

September 28th, 1970

Mrs. Betty Tate,
Secretary,
The Communist Party,
Camden Borough Committee,
43 Kelly Street, N.W.1.

Dear Mrs. Tate,

Thank you for your letter of 24th September.

~~SM~~ not seen in FCO: but
presumably enclosing
a copy of their telegram
to the S. of S.

I think your organisation would have been better employed in urging the Russians and the Syrians to cease their trouble-making in the Middle East. If the Russians had strictly observed the cease-fire arranged by the Americans and the Syrians had not invaded Jordan, things would be somewhat easier.

As for the release of criminals like Leila Khaled, Mr. Heath has now been proved completely right in refusing to release such people until all the innocent hostages were set free.

Yours sincerely,

1/

GEOFFREY FINSBERG

Charges to pay

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TELEGRAM

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At

To

By

PRIORITY FOREIGN SECRETARY FOREIGN OFFICE

WHITEHALL SM1 =


NEJ/EPH

CABLED LONDON COMMUNISTS URGE NO INTERVENTION IN
JORDAN BY BRITAIN. ALSO ASK YOU ANY SUCH ACTION BY
AMERICAN OR ISRAEL +

For free repetition of doubtful words telegraph "TELEGRAMS ENQUIRY" or call, with this form

SM1 + TSC TGMS LN accompanied by this form, and, if possible, the envelope.

B or C



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London S.W.1

(158)

(13)

From The Minister of State

14 October, 1970

DESPATCHED BY
MINISTER OF STATE 3 OCT 1970

pm um
3014

NEJ3/3548/1

Sir Alec Douglas-Home has asked me to thank you for your letter of 28 September in which you enclosed a copy of your letter to the Camden Borough Communist Party.

I was glad to see the robust tone of your reply, with which I fully sympathise. It is of course difficult for a Minister to express himself so forcefully and directly to the public!

(Joseph Godber)

Geoffrey Finsberg, Esq., M.B.E., J.P., M.P.,
House of Commons,
London S.W.1.

PERSONAL

Mr. Renwick

M.P.'s letter


Flag A

Mr. Geoffrey Finsberg M.P. has written to the Secretary of State enclosing a copy of a letter he has sent to the Camden Borough Communist Party. Clearly he has received from the

Flag B

Communists a copy of the telegram which they addressed to the Secretary of State on 24 September. Because of its form and content the Department did not send a reply to the Communist telegram: but we welcome the robust way that Mr. Finsberg has answered it.

2. I submit a draft reply to Mr. Finsberg.


(S.L. Egerton)
Near Eastern Department
13 October, 1970

Pl. enter am 3/11

Copy for NES 22/1
✓ done

(14)

Summary Record of Meeting

The Political Future of Jordan and
Anglo-Jordanian Relations

NES 3/548/1

Discussion at V.C.C. on 26 October, 1970

Pr
5/11

Present:

Sir Philip Adams
H.M. Ambassador at Amman
Mr. R.M. Evans
Mr. W.R. Tomkys
Mr. C.W. Long

(copies were sent to
participants at
Chambers, Amman)

The position of King Hussein was rather stronger than had seemed likely in the immediate aftermath of the fighting in September. He had in the September fighting achieved the disruption of the Fedayeen and won renewed respect from the Army and the population, although at some political cost in the Arab World at large and in terms of bitterness against him from his Palestinian subjects. He had gained time. But his gains would be dissipated unless there was progress towards a settlement of the Arab/Israel conflict (and this was unfortunately unlikely). It was also agreed that the Fedayeen would have to acquiesce in any moves he made towards settlement. This implied that the main body of the Fedayeen must be united under a moderate leader such as Yasser Arafat (King Hussein disliked Arafat and was trying to build up Ibrahim Bakr of the P.L.O. as a substitute).

2. It was noted that the U.S. Government had decided firmly to back King Hussein. Their prompt response to his request for large quantities of ammunition, and their readiness to help in the relief operation and the rehabilitation efforts now beginning, were evidence of this. American aid to Jordan could be regarded as an extension of and counterweight to American aid to Israel, and at least partly motivated by the desire of the Americans to avoid being totally identified with Israel. The American Ambassador in Amman had told Mr. Phillips recently that the U.S. Government proposed to offer Jordan loan finance of \$30 million shortly (of this sum \$63 million had already been spent!)

3. The Fedayeen had suffered severely in the recent fighting. They had lost in casualties, material and especially in organisation; many of their papers had been captured. Their will to resist the regime and capacity to disrupt administration had also been severely reduced. In order to maintain their credibility they would have to resume operations against Israel (which had come to an almost complete halt). But if no progress were made towards a settlement, they would probably become a serious threat again.

4. After the fighting the morale of the Army was high. The King had removed or was about to remove some of his more hawkish generals and it could be expected that the army command would return to General Nashhur Haditha or someone of approximately the same kind. The Americans were sending out a mission to advise the Jordan army on reorganisation, to make it more mobile and better able to defend Jordan's frontiers with Syria and Iraq.

5. The casualties in September had amounted to some 2,400 dead (including 410 soldiers killed) and a similar or slightly greater number of wounded. No British community or Embassy local staff had been killed or injured. Progress made since 27 September through the efforts of the Tunisian Prime Minister in implementing the Cairo Agreement was encouraging. But the situation would remain uncertain for some time to come. Meanwhile, the Ambassador did not recommend the return of the representatives of British firms or of British technical assistance experts to Jordan. It would take some substantial time for business confidence to be built up again.

6. It was agreed that our best policy would be to continue to give help and support to King Hussein but inconspicuously and without irrevocable commitment. This policy would fit in well with U.S. support for King Hussein. We should begin by contributing to Jordan's rehabilitation effort.

Pl. p.w. on
Anglo-Indonesian
relations

Mr. Bottomley
Parliamentary Clerk

NEJ 3/548/1

Hijacking

11/11

12/11

I submit a draft written reply to Mr. Frank Taylor's P.Q. for answer on 10 November, but received too late for that day. The reply has been cleared with the Department of Trade and Industry, the Treasury and Near Eastern Department.

submit
me.

(R. Hanbury-Tenison)
Aviation & Telecommunications Dept.
10 November, 1970

c.c. Near Eastern Dept. ✓

PARLIAMENTARY QUESTION

10th November 1970
for WRITTEN answer on

Ar. d. tel.
The draft reply should
reach the Parliamentary
Office through your
Under-Secretary by

1264
10am Wed 11/11

- U. Mr. Frank Taylor (Manchester, Moss Side): To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, whether compensation is being demanded from the Jordanian Government in respect of the destruction of a British aircraft in territory under their jurisdiction and the illegal detention of British subjects following the piracy of that aircraft. .

No Sir.

I do not believe that the Jordanian Government can in any way be held responsible for the destruction of this aircraft or the detention of its passengers and crew.

17 Eaton Square, London, S. W. 1

2 Nov 1970

15

Dear Alice,

Last week I was out in Jordan as the Guest of King Hussain. I travelled around Northern Jordan with Crown Prince Hassan and visited a number of army military commands in the field. I also had a long talk with Wasfi Tall before he became Prime Minister. On the trips to the north of Jordan, we were accompanied by the First Secretary from our Embassy in Amman who doubtless has already submitted a report.

I found the situation in Jordan very much more encouraging than the picture painted by the Press and other media here. For this reason, I felt I should give you my impressions of what I saw myself, and what I heard from the King.

I would have preferred to see you, but I know how busy you are, and so I am writing to you instead.

1. Acknowledgement ✓ 6/11
2. Secretary of State ~~etc etc~~ has not seen
3. N-E for 5/11

5/11

The Present situation in Jordan

The King told me that the Fedayin organisations have been broken in Amman and Zirqah and in most of the north, and of course in the south too. The Jordanian population of the East Bank want to lead a normal life and have turned against the Fedayin, so it will be very difficult for the Fedayin to start up again on any scale in the foreseeable future. The Palastinians number not more than one third of the total population of the East Bank. The Fedayin Commandoes are now withdrawing from all towns in Jordan to the mountain areas of Jarash and Ajlun. The towns of Amman and Zirqah are now already more or less cleared, although there are the odd small gangs still hiding in parts of Amman. The towns of Irbid and Al Ramta in the North are firmly in the hands of the Jordanian authorities, although the Commandoes are still there but unarmed. The Jordanian army closely surrounds these two places and can enter at any time if it wishes. The army however have been told to leave the job of clearing out the commandoes to the Arab Peace Committee, in order to avoid unnecessary incidents.

The
The King felt Fedayin Commandoes were no longer a menace to the Jordanian state, but there may still be the odd incident as the Fedayin have to show some activities in order to justify themselves in asking money from their outside backers.

The King said the army had remained loyal throughout the crisis including the great majority of the Palastinians in it. The morale of the army was now immensely high. They were delighted with their victory over the Syrians and very pleased with the performance of the centurian tanks and the 105 m/m guns which had proved superior to the Russian TU54 and 55's of the Syrian army. The Syrians were unlikely to make any

further military ventures in Jordan again for some time. The King thought the 18000 strong Iraqi army would also withdraw in the near future, after the fiasco of their hostile manoeuvres in Jordan during the crisis.

The King was shocked to ^{learn} ~~hear~~ the extent of Nasser's and the Egyptian political and subversive influence among the "old politicians" as well as among the Fedayin. But now the Fedayin organisations were smashed, the old "discredited" politicians had been dropped - and anyway, Nasser himself was dead. So the Egyptian ^{stronghold} ~~stronghold~~ on Jordan was broken.

The King said he intends to reorganise his administration and his armed forces. He hopes America and Britain will help him in this. He felt to-day was the first real chance since the 1967 war for Jordan to develop.

The King also intended ~~ed~~ to change the role of the armed Forces to meet an attack from anywhere - meaning Syria and Iraq - and not just from Israel, with which he hopes there will now be peace. The role of the Jordanian airforce will now become one of attack against ground forces and tanks. The Jordanians will also train more parachutists and special mobile units.

Jordan's role in the area

The King felt Jordan's position had been greatly strengthened by the ending of the menace of the Fedayin. The Egyptian influence in Jordan has also been removed by recent events, although the problem of the Palastinians still remains. The Syrians had received a bloody nose, and the Iraqis were withdrawing in some confusion from Jordan. There were already some repercussions in Damascus, and similar or perhaps greater ones were bound to follow in Baghdad. Now was the time for Jordan to reconstruct and develop without the burdens of war with Israel. In the long run, however, there would not be peace in Jordan or the area until there were decent governments in Baghdad and Damascus. Nasser's death had created a vacuum in the Middle East, and Jordan with British and American help could play a constructive part in bringing to power reasonable governments in both Iraq and Syria.

Urgent requests from the Jordanians to HMG

The King said he urgently needed replacements of military equipment for his armed forces. The most urgent need was for 105 m/m shells (H.E.A.T and H.E.S.H.) for the centurian tank guns and 76 m/m for the Saracen a/car guns. The King hoped HMG would help him in this as soon as possible. Help was also needed as soon as possible from HMG to restore the electricity system in Amman, and Zirqa, and the telephones and water system in Amman. There were also, of course, many other projects in Jordan in which he hoped HMG and British forces could help; such as irrigation, electrification, airfields etc.

The King's doubts

The King was very pleased with the attitudes of the Americans during the crisis but less so with us. The King and Crown Prince Hassan harangued me at some length about how they wanted the closest ties with us, but they felt that this feeling was not being reciprocated by us. Apparently, contact with London was lost during the crisis, and some misunderstanding seems to have arisen in their minds about whether H.M.G. really wants to help them; or are we, they asked, losing interest in Jordan? I understand that the King is sending Zaid Rifai to London as Ambassador which shows how seriously the King takes his relations with us, as Zaid is one of his most trusted friends. The King himself said he hoped to come to London as soon as he could, perhaps towards the end of the month, and discuss all these matters with you.

Absolutely
NOT!

I am sorry to burden you with these points, but I felt I should let you have them for your consideration.

Yours ever

Neil McKean



3 Nov 1970

17 EATON SQUARE
LONDON S.W.1
BELGRAVIA 7586

File
All
Ting,

I am sending you a copy of the memorandum Dr Khalid Salameh, Governor of the Central Bank of Jordan, is a sort of aide-memoire to our meeting at White last week.

I am also writing on the political aspects of the situation in Jordan and its possible role in the area. To Alec Home. Think. Think

These notes cover most of the debated
points of the Indian constitution,
such as I believe 'savage' things
The normal channels.

I enjoyed our talk greatly
Many thanks for sparing the time

Yours

Billy Melton

IN CONFIDENCE

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London S.W.1

6 November, 1970

From The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State

Your information from Amman was most useful and appreciated.

We have decided, as a matter of policy, to maintain our aid to Jordan as it was before the recent fracas, and in addition to make contributions over and above that to rehabilitation. In that regard we are leaving the medical equipment which we flew in, and making large payments towards the restoration of public facilities in Amman. We will resume our work on the Aquaba airport and the Amman electricity scheme.

One item of military equipment which presents a difficulty is the 105 m.m. ammunition, but that is only because we ourselves are very short. But we are helping the Jordanians to locate stocks held by other countries.

It is certainly important to us that King Hussein should be aware of our efforts to sustain Jordan, and I am therefore very grateful to you for pointing out that assurances from us should be made.

Please keep in touch about all this.

(Anthony Kershaw)

W.
Colonel McLean,
17 Eaton Square,
London, S.W.1.

IN CONFIDENCE

(w16)

15

13/11

Private Secretary

SECRET

NEJ 3/548/1

Anglo-Jordanian Relations

Flap A
Flap B
Flap C

Colonel Billy McLean has written to the Secretary of State enclosing a most interesting report of his recent visit to Jordan. He has also written to the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State and Mr. Kershaw has replied.

I submit a possible draft reply to Colonel McLean for consideration by the Secretary of State.

S. J. Egerton

(S.J. Egerton)
Near Eastern Department
11 November, 1970

13/11 13/11
Pl note that one
has to try and chat up
12 November, 1970

friends of Ministers who
take trouble to write in,
not send them stuffy
replies! 13/11

Thank you very much indeed for the most interesting
and informative report which you sent me with your letter
of 3 November about your recent visit to Jordan and your
impressions of the country.

The passage which interested me most was the paragraph
headed "The King's Doubts". It is not true, in any but
the most literal sense, that contact between us and the
King was lost during the September crisis. We remained
in the closest touch and any momentary loss of contact
was the result of the King's unavailability rather than
of ours. The claim that we are losing interest in Jordan
is also quite unjustified, as I made clear to the King at
President Nasser's funeral, and as I shall repeat to him,
thanks to your warning, when he is next in London. I
shall also tell his new Ambassador when he calls on me
that Anglo-Jordanian relations remain of great importance
to us.

(attached)

I think Tony Kershaw in his letter of 6 November has
told you about our intentions on development aid to

/Jordan.

Colonel W. McLean
17 Eaton Square,
London, S.W.1.

Jordan. These I think speak for themselves.

Anyhow, many thanks again for your letter.

(ALEC DOUGLAS-HOME)

CONFIDENTIAL

Revised 1.9.70

Country Assessment Sheet

JORDAN

Section I: British Objectives in Jordan

British objectives in Jordan are:-

- (1) to assist Jordan to reach a permanent peace settlement with Israel, since such a settlement would
 - (a) be a major contribution to world peace;
 - (b) hinder the spread of Soviet influence in the Middle East;
 and
 - (c) strengthen the position of moderate and pro-Western leaders in the Arab world.
- (2) to assist King Hussein to strengthen his position as the leader of Jordan since,
 - (a) he seems the leader most likely to contribute to objective (1) above;
 - (b) he is a moderate and pro-Western Arab leader, whose stabilising influence contributes to the stability of the remaining pro-Western régimes in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf.

2. Jordan is a small, poor country, truncated since the June war and heavily dependent on foreign aid. British investment is small but our position as major exporters and arms suppliers earned us a useful £30-40 million in 1968. We have traditional and historical links with Jordan and with the Hashemite family dating back more than fifty years.

3. Jordan's poverty (taken with the establishment of Israel) has resulted in the migration of very large numbers of educated Jordanians, mainly of Palestinian origin, to the wealthy but backward Arab states, where they can vitally affect important British interests. For example Jordanians represent about one quarter of the population of Kuwait, and form a vital element in the labour force of many of the Western owned oil companies.

CONFIDENTIAL

Section II: British Mission in Jordan: Direction of Effort

<u>Function</u>	<u>Current Budgeting Programme Category</u>	<u>Relative Importance (percentage)</u>	<u>Costed Manpower Effort</u>
			£
International Organisation	1a	2	850
General representation VIPs	1b	6	7,270
Political interpretation	1b	22	17,700
Political negotia- tion (other than under 1a)	1b	8	4,350
Defence work (general)	1b	10	610
Public relations work in support of foregoing activities	1c	5	4,120
Defence aid and sales	1d, IIa	10	850
Export promotion	IIa	10	7,690
Economic and commercial policy	IIb	2	1,940
Publicity for export promotion and economic publicity	IIc	3	1,160
Cultural work	IIa	2	1,650
Consular and immigration work	III, IVa	10	2,150
Aid	VI	10	9,850

CONTENTS

Section II: Direction of Effort

Defence Attachés

We have not included figures for our Defence Attaché, Air Attaché or Assistant Military Attaché in the Rented Accommodation column. They have difficulty in providing us with details of their pay and allowances, and suggest that you should get these from the Ministry of Defence. Their effort is spread over the various functions in the following proportions:-

	<u>Defence Attaché</u>	<u>Air Attaché</u>	<u>Assistant Military Attaché</u>
General Representation, VIPs	20%	20%	20%
Political Interpretation	5%	5%	15%
Defence Work (general)	30%	30%	25%
Public relations in support of foregoing	5%	10%	5%
Defence aid and sales	40%	35%	35%

The annual local cost of rented accommodation for our Defence Attachés is as follows:-

Defence Attaché	£ 1,458
Air Attaché	£ 2,333 (furnished)
Asst. Military Attaché	£ 1,983 (furnished)

Accommodation

We have not been able to calculate the amortized value of the Ambassador's and Counsellor's houses, both of which are owned by U.K., from the RMA returns sent to us. For the Counsellor's house, we have used the figure of £2,750, which is the amount of rent paid for the house before it was purchased. For the Residence, we have taken the figure of £5,800, which is based on the rent of the Counsellor's house in proportion to its purchase price scaled up in proportion to the purchase price of the Residence.

A minor possible source of inaccurate comparison lies in the fact that the rent we pay for some of our houses - those of the Second Secretary (£1,750), the Air Attaché and the Asst. Military Attaché mentioned above - includes a charge for furniture, while our other rented accommodation is unfurnished.

Allowances

In calculating allowances we have been comprehensive, including education allowances and language allowances. For the accountable entertainment allowance and indirect representational supplement, we have taken the total permitted, not the total actually drawn.

CONFIDENTIAL

Section III: Economic and Political Structure

The Jordanian economy is heavily dependent on foreign aid, mainly from Arab Governments. The country is handicapped by the loss of the West Bank, the closure of the Suez Canal and the sudden increase in the number of refugees after the June 1967 War (more than 50 per cent of the population are refugees). The domestic economy is still based largely on agriculture, but the Jordanian Government is stimulating growth in the phosphate, cement and oil refining industries. Jordan has a free-market economy based on private enterprise, in which major development projects are handled by the Jordan Development Board.

2. The control of the Government is in the hands of King Hussein. The King works through a Council of Ministers, who while nominally answerable to the Senate and House of Representatives, are appointed and replaced by him. Palestine Arab guerilla organisations operate from Jordanian territory and although they are divided among themselves, they enjoy the support of the majority of the population and in some respects constitute a state within a state. The King relies on the Army and Security Forces to maintain his position, but in the event of a show-down between the King and the fedayeen, it is not certain that the King could hold his own. The King has been obliged to concede considerable freedom of movement to the guerillas.

Country Assessment Sheet

Jordan

Section IV: Essential Facts

x Items marked: see comments attached.

* See Notes below.

Serial	A - BASIC	Year	
1	Area		Before June 1967 96,610 sq. km. (E. Bank 90,960 sq. km. W. Bank 5,650 sq. km.)
2	Capital	1969	Amman
3	Population (a) total	(a) 1969	2,200,000 (of whom 1,600,000 on E. Bank, 600,000 on W. Bank)
	(b) average annual rate of increase 1965-7	(b)	approx. 3%
4	Religion(s)	1969	Sunni Muslims
5	Official language(s)	1969	Arabic
6	Form of government	1969	Monarchy: with Council of Ministers; and a legislative body consisting of a Senate (of 30 appointed members) and a House of Representatives (60 elected members)
DEFENSE			
* 7	Proportion of G.N.P.	1967	13.4 per cent
8	*(a) Navy	1969	150 men
	(b) Army	1969	55,000-58,000 men (including mobilized reserve 3,000-6,000): 350 modern tanks

(c)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Serial

Year

(c) Air Force

1969

3,500 men; 62 pilots; 54 air craft (including 15 non-combat)

(d) Police

1969

Public Security Forces and Police (3,500)
Special Branch & CO (plus 1,000 admin. staff)
2 Battalions Desert Police: (2,000) (para-military)
Civil Defence Force and Civil Militia (unknown strength)

9

Alliances or Treaties

1945

Arab League Collective Security Pact;

1962

Military Alliance with Saudi Arabia

1967

Joint Defence Agreement with U.A.R. and Iraq

1968

Eastern Front Command (with Iraq and Syria)

0 - 110

10

11

See comments

12

13

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CONFIDENTIAL

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<u>Serial</u>		<u>Year</u>	
14	Official reserves	1969 (Aug)	US \$ 260,000,000
15	Aid (a) donor or recipient	1969	Recipient
	(b) amount (to or from where and in what proportions)	1968	Total US \$ 134,500,000 of which US \$ 107,000,000 from Arab sources: bilateral aid US \$ 6,500,000 from U.S.
<u>D - BRITISH INVOLVEMENT</u>			
<u>Politico/Defence</u>			
16	Treaty or quasi-treaty	1969	None
17	Defence facilities available to U.K.	1969	None
*18	Military assistance from U.K.	1969	Military Liaison Scheme: Middle East Liaison Scheme: training visits to units in Cyprus (12 officers and airmen: 35 officers and 170 airmen (RCAF) plus believed under 35 (Jordan Army) training in U.K. Financed by Jordan except for grant-in-aid of \$1,500. British adviser on Tigercat (RAF Gen. Ldr.) in Jordan.
*19	Diplomatic representation (excluding U.K. and other "embassy" staff)	1969-70	20 U.K. based staff Cost £20,000
20	British Council expenses in Jordan (Exclusive of British Council Headquarters expenditure)	1969-70	\$58,165 net estimated (Revenue \$4,691): 4 U.K. based staff
*21	Resident Community	1969	600
<u>Economic</u>			
22	UK Trade (a) exports + re-exports (f.o.b.)	1967	\$7,020,000

/(b)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Serial

Year

x

(b) imports (c.i.f.)

1968

24,39,000

23

*Aid (a) capital

1968-71

\$5,000,000 Development Loan

(b) technical assistance

\$220,000 per annum approx.

Main capital aid projects:

(a) Aqaba Airport

(b) Irbid Electricity Expansion

(c) Kerak-Masa

(d) Wadi Ghuleil

} Irrigation projects

H - ANY SPECIAL ECONOMIC CO-OPERATIONS

None

CONFIDENTIAL

Section IV: Jordan

- B Serial 7 Since the June 1967 war Jordanian defence expenditure has been at a rate of more than JD 40 m. per annum; but no G.O.P. figure more recent than 1967 is available.
- C Serial 10 We assume that the £ exchange rate of £1.17.0 = JD 1 was given in error. Since calculation the figure has been JD 1 = £1.3.4.
- Serial 11 1967 figures (from Jordan Central Bank statistical Bulletin August 1969) are:
(a) US \$ 494,450,000
(b) not known
(c) as given
- Serial 12 Figures for 1968 are available throughout (in Jordan Department of Statistics "External Trade Statistics 1968", published Sept. 1969):
(a) US \$ 54,160,000
(b) Phosphates
Fruit and vegetables
Tobacco
(c) Arab countries 67% (incl. Kuwait 19.6%)
India 15.5%
(d) US \$ 161,000,000
(e) U.K. 12.4%
U.S.A. 10.9%
W. Germany 10.3%
- Serial 13 Figures for 1968 are available (in Jordan Central Bank Statistical Bulletin August 1969):
(a) JD 14.36 m. (deficit)
(b) JD 43.04 m. (deficit)
- D Serial 18 Precise figure of Jordan Army Personnel training in U.K. in 1969 is available from AMI, H.O.D.
- Serial 19 Present U.K. based staff of the Mission is 20
- Serial 21 1969 Resident British Community in Jordan numbers 600
- Serial 22 (b) Since Jordanian statistics give a figure for 1968 of JD 3,600, we question the figure of 2,39,000 given here.

Reference NEJ 3/548/1

②/⑦

N/Ac for file

Jordan: Country Assessment Sheet

(interalia)

This was discussed at a meeting of D.V.S.S.

on 10/11/50. On the Amman Embassy it was

agreed that reflections of staff since

September shd be reported as being mostly

temporary.

am

16/11

Enter < p.a.

18

Sir Philip Adams
Parliamentary Unit

19/11

Anglo-Jordanian relations:
Parliamentary Question from Mr. Biggs-Davison

Mr. Biggs-Davison has a general interest in the Arab/Israel dispute. He has not recently asked any questions specifically on Anglo-Jordanian relations. His motive in doing so at the present time is not clear; public interest in Jordan at the time of the hijackings and the civil war in late September has now subsided, but he may have heard of King Hussein's reported intention to visit this country soon. We have no precise information about this, but have asked the Embassy in Amman for a report.

2. The answer suggested for supplementary No. 5 may accordingly have to be revised before 16 November in the light of any reply from Amman.

S. L. Egerton
(S. L. Egerton)
Near Eastern Department
10 November, 1970

Philip Adams
10/11

promotion and visa and immigration work, is £12.7 million, towards which passport and consular fees at present levels contribute £4.2 million. The new scale of fees referred to by my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer on 27th October will yield an estimated extra £6 million in a full year.—[Vol. 805, c. 39.]

Jordan

* Mr. Patrick McNair-Wilson asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs if he will make a statement on the emergency aid provided to Jordan by Her Majesty's Government to help relieve the suffering caused by recent disturbances in that country.

Mr. Anthony Royle: We made arrangements to provide relief aid immediately after receiving an appeal for such aid from King Hussein on 19th September. The aid took two forms: the provision of supplies and the provision of medical assistance. We began to airlift supplies to Jordan on 23rd September: 24½ tons of medical supplies and 80 tons of food were sent to Amman by 30th September. Our programme of medical assistance was launched soon after. Medical units, manned by 151 service personnel who had volunteered and had been enrolled in the British Red Cross Society, were flown to Amman and began treating casualties on 1st October. Some 650 patients have since received treatment and over 240 surgical operations have been performed.

Our relief operation has been co-ordinated with the relief operations of other countries, all under the auspices of the International Committee of the Red Cross.

Now that the immediate need has been met, the British medical units were withdrawn between 1st November and 3rd November. The costs of our operation will not be finally established for some time, but it is estimated that they will be in the region of £300,000. Parliament will be asked to approve the necessary Supplementary Estimate in due course. In the meantime, advances are being sought, as necessary, from the Civil Contingencies Fund.

Reports on the progress of the relief operation show that it contributed greatly to the relief of suffering in

608

Jordan. Great credit is due to the members of the medical units and others who contributed to its success.

DEFENCE

South-East Asia (Land Forces)

Mr. Sheldon asked the Minister of State for Defence when the land forces in South-East Asia will be reduced to the battalion group mentioned in the Defence White Paper.

Mr. Ian Gilmour: On present plans, during 1971.

SOCIAL SERVICES

Medicinal Tablets (Children)

Mr. Marten asked the Secretary of State for Social Services how many children were admitted to hospital in the last convenient twelve months having taken medicinal tablets in error.

Mr. Alison: Information is not available in the form requested. It is estimated that, in the year 1967, between 12,000 and 15,000 children under the age of 15 were in-patients in hospital in England and Wales because of medicinal poisoning. The poisons involved were:

	Number of spells in hospital†
Morphine, opium etc. ...	207
Barbiturates ...	878
Aspirin and salicylates ...	5,905
Bromides ...	22
Other analgesic and soporific ...	1,383
Sulfonamides ...	55
Strychnine ...	22
Belladonna, Hyoscine etc. ...	1,065
Other unspecified drugs ...	2,251
Other unspecified drugs and poisons* ...	3,381

† Estimated total based on 10 per cent. sample.

* This includes poisons other than drugs.

Further details are given in table 5 of the Report on Hospital In-patient Inquiry for the year 1967, part I.

Confidential and Personal Files

Mr. Leslie Huckfield asked the Secretary of State for Social Services what instructions have been given by him to his Departmental staff about the exchanging

DATE 4 NOV 70

COL :399-400.

VOL : 805

importance to wide adherence to it. We doubt whether the insertion of the additional clause proposed would be practical at this stage.

Middle East

Mr. Judd asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs whether he will make a statement on the British Government's policy towards the inclusion of leaders of the Palestinian Arabs in international negotiations for a settlement in the Middle East.

Mr. Joseph Godber: Security Council Resolution 242 of November 1967 provides the only generally agreed basis for a peaceful settlement in the Middle East. The Palestinian resistance organisations reject this Resolution and seek a multi-national state in Palestine which would involve the elimination of Israel as a State in its present character. We do not therefore think that discussion of the present programme of the Palestinian organisations is compatible with the search for a settlement in accordance with Security Council Resolution 242. But we recognise that any lasting settlement would have to attract general acceptance from all the peoples of the area, including the Palestinians.

Mr. Coleman asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs whether Her Majesty's Government accepts Resolution No. 465 on the situation in the Middle East which has been adopted by the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe; and what action the Government have taken or propose to take on the resolution.

Mr. Anthony Royle: Our aim in the Middle East is the achievement of a fair and lasting settlement based on Security Council Resolution 242. We are in agreement with the proposals in Resolution No. 465 of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe to the extent that these are consistent with the terms and balance of the Security Council Resolution.

We are determined to uphold the security of the Mediterranean area.

Mr. Heffer asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs

what action Her Majesty's Government are taking to bring about peace in the Middle East.

Mr. Godber: We are participating in the Four Power talks in New York and in the General Assembly debate on this subject currently taking place. We are also in frequent touch with all Governments concerned about ways in which progress towards peace might be made.

Peaceful Uses of the Sea-bed

Mr. Skeet asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what is the Government's policy towards the proposals submitted by states to the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-bed beyond the 200-metre limit; and if he will set out in the OFFICIAL REPORT a précis of the United Kingdom proposals.

Mr. Anthony Royle: The United Kingdom, France and the United States have tabled proposals in the form of working papers, all of which are reproduced in full as appendices to the report of the 10th Session of the United Nations Conference on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-bed. Of these only the United States working paper refers to the 200 metre isobath as a limit. Her Majesty's Government have welcomed both the United States and French working papers as bases for discussion and are giving the contents of both careful consideration.

The main headings of the United Kingdom proposal for an International Convention for the Sea Bed and Ocean Floor and the Limits of National Jurisdiction, which was tabled without formal commitment to Her Majesty's Government, are as follows:

1. The régime should be established by means of an international agreement.
2. The régime should govern the exploration of the sea-bed and ocean floor, and of their subsoil and the exploitation of the natural resources of this area.
3. The agreement should define the area in which the régime was to apply.
4. The agreement should provide that the establishment of the régime did not affect the legal status of the superjacent waters as High seas or that of the air space above those waters.

REFERENCES

- 79
- A. Mr. Royle's Written Answer of 4 November, 1970
(vol. 805: cols. 399-400).
 - B. Mr. Godber's Written Answer of 2 November, 1970
(vol. 805: cols. 266).

NOTES FOR SUPPLEMENTARIES

Arms Supplies

It is not our practice to comment on the details of individual arms transactions.

Aid for Jordan

2. We have traditionally supplied developmental aid to Jordan on a substantial scale. We naturally keep our aid activities under constant review, but we expect and hope to continue to provide aid to Jordan as appropriate.

The Palestinians

3. As ^{my old friend} I said in my speech at Harrogate on 31 October, we continue to work for a Middle East settlement which will attract the agreement of all the peoples in the area, including the Palestinians, and which takes account of their legitimate aspirations.

Future Prospects of King Hussein

4. The House will not expect me to comment on the internal affairs of another country.

Will King Hussein visit London soon?

5. I have no idea. But the King is a frequent visitor here and if he should come we should naturally give him an appropriate welcome.

Arab/Israel dispute

6. I would refer my hon. Friend to the answer ^{I gave} ~~given by me~~
to the hon. Member for Halton
rt. hon. Friend the Member for Grantham on 2 November.

Flag B

The hostages held after the September hijackings

7. That, Sir, is another question.

PARLIAMENTARY QUESTION

18th November 1970

for **ORAL** answer on.....

N.E.D. (19)
The draft reply should
reach the Parliamentary
Office through your
Under-Secretary by
79

Wm Tuesday 10/11

*U. Mr. John Biggs-Davison (Chigwell, Essex):
To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign
and Commonwealth Affairs, whether he will
make a statement about Anglo-Jordanian
relations.

Mr. Joseph E. ...

Our relations with the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan
continue to be close and friendly.

JS

Mr. Godber: I would refer to the reply I gave earlier today to my hon. Friend the Member for Bournemouth, East and Christchurch (Mr. Cordle).

Anglo-Jordanian Relations

* Mr. Biggs-Davison asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs whether he will make a statement about Anglo-Jordanian relations.

Mr. Godber: Our relations with the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan continue to be close and friendly.

WALES

Midwives

78. Mr. Barry Jones asked the Secretary of State for Wales how many midwives are employed in Wales and East Flintshire, respectively, in the public service; what steps he is taking to increase the number of trainees and to relieve the shortage; and if he will make a statement.

Mr. Peter Thomas: 1,210 for Wales and 89 for the whole of Flintshire at 30th September, 1969. Separate figures for East Flintshire are not available. Recruitment of trainees is a matter for the hospital authorities concerned.

School Pupils (Cost)

79. Mr. Barry Jones asked the Secretary of State for Wales what was the average annual cost to a local education authority in Wales of each pupil in a comprehensive school, a primary school, and a nursery school, respectively, for the latest financial year for which the calculation is possible.

Mr. Peter Thomas: Based on the information published by the Institute of Municipal Treasurers and Accountants and the Society of County Treasurers, the average cost in 1968-69 to the local education authorities in Wales of each pupil in a secondary school and a primary school was respectively £156.31 and £90.64. It is not possible to isolate the relevant costs for comprehensive schools.

The average cost of each pupil in maintained nursery schools in 1968-69 based on information provided by the local education authorities was £188.

B R 3

Farming Costs

Mr. Elystan Morgan asked the Secretary of State for Wales if he will initiate a survey of higher production costs experienced by farmers in Wales so that its results can be published before the Price Review of 1971.

Mr. Peter Thomas: No. I would refer the hon. Member to the replies given to his previous Questions on 30th October and 4th November.—[Vol. 805, c. 238 and 408.]

Forestry

Mr. Gwynoro Jones asked the Secretary of State for Wales what was the number of people employed by the Forestry Commission in Carmarthenshire in 1950, 1960, 1965, and the latest available year; and how this compares with Wales as a whole.

Mr. Peter Thomas: The following is the information:

			Carmarthenshire	Wales
1950	215	3,091
1960	220	3,431
1965	200	2,943
1970	150	1,846

The statistics for Carmarthenshire have been estimated since several of the Commission's forests straddle the county boundary.

Sheep Breeding

Mr. Barry Jones asked the Secretary of State for Wales what plans he has for encouraging the large-scale use of hormone controlled multiple births and the introduction of more purpose-made hybrids in sheep breeding in Wales.

Mr. Peter Thomas: None at present. Experimental work is still going on.

Welsh Hospital Board (Expenditure)

Mr. Denzil Davies asked the Secretary of State for Wales what was the per capita expenditure of the Welsh Hospital Board for the year 1969-70.

Mr. Peter Thomas: The per capita expenditure of the hospital service in Wales in 1969-70 was £21 3s. 3d.

Hospitals Beds

Mr. Denzil Davies asked the Secretary of State for Wales what is the average

DATE 16 Nov 70

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16th November 1970

- U. Mr. John Biggs-Davison (Chigwell, Essex):
To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign
and Commonwealth Affairs, whether he will
make a statement about Anglo-Jordanian
relations.

NO. 15W

MR. JOSEPH GODBER

Our relations with the Hashemite Kingdom
of Jordan continue to be close and friendly.

18th November 1970

- U. Mr. John Biggs-Davison (Chigwell, Essex):
To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign
and Commonwealth Affairs, whether he will
make a statement about Anglo-Jordanian
relations.


NO. 15W

MR. JOSEPH GODBER

Our relations with the Hashemite Kingdom
of Jordan continue to be close and friendly.

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Pl. enter w. 24/11



BRITISH EMBASSY

(23)

(1/1)

16 November 1970

Gm

Dear Christopher,

NEJ 3/548/1?

23/11

(14)

Please refer to para 5 of the summary report of the meeting on the political future of Jordan held on 16 October. The Ambassador said, I understand, (as we had already reported by telegram at the time) mention that one British subject, Miss Coates of Leeds, was wounded in the fighting. (He came into the Embassy this morning, and has evidently made a good recovery.)

Yours sincerely,



(C.P. Carter)

C.M. Long, Esq.,
Near Eastern Department,
F.C.O.

RESTRICTED

Mr. Goodwin

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(24)

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Mr. Hope-Jones

Mr. Tesh

Secretary of State

Sir Philip Ayles. W

R. M. Evans

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2611

13 November, 1970.

Mr. Royle reported to me that Mr. Amery has been saying various things which do not seem wholly in accord with Government policy in relation to the Middle East. At my suggestion, therefore, Mr. Amery came to see me today to let me have his views.

2. He expressed concern on three main points:

- (1) our policy in the Gulf;
- (2) our relationship with King Hussein; and
- (3) the internal position in Iraq.

3. On (1) he expressed the very firm hope that we would not withdraw our position in the Gulf at the end of 1971. I told him that no decisions had been taken as yet about what our ultimate policy would be but that it was quite clear that none of the States concerned would be willing to request us to stay in the area. It was therefore a matter of deciding what we could do without encouraging developments of the kind that took place in Aden.

4. Mr. Amery said that he hoped that at least we would retain 1 battalion of troops in the Gulf. I said I thought that 1 battalion would be very difficult indeed to arrange. What was more likely would be the possibility of some smaller units in advisory or training capacities but I emphasised that no decisions of any kind had yet been taken.

5. With regard to King Hussein, he was apparently basing himself on conversations between the King, Hassan and Sharif Nasser on the one hand, and Billy Mclean on the other. He said that first Hassan, and then the King, had spoken in strong terms about Britain's unwillingness to give the King the full support that he needed at a critical stage in his internal struggle. It appears that

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this refers to his appeals for help when the Syrians were advancing southward towards Amman. I said that, if this criticism was valid against us, it was equally valid against the Americans and the Israelis. I further said that we took the view that overt intervention at that time would have had disastrous effects for King Hussein whatever else it might have done.

6. Mr. Amery then said that King Hussein also felt that the British underestimated the extent of his defeat of the fedayeen. The King's view was that he had crushed the fedayeen but he got the impression that the British still felt that the fedayeen were a strong force in Jordan. He felt that, because of this wrong assessment, Britain was not being as helpful as she might be. I noted this but said that I found it difficult to understand this view because we felt that we had given all reasonable help to him.

7. He then advanced the idea that King Hussein might be willing to do a separate deal to reach a peace settlement with Israel. I said to him that I doubted this very much because I thought, if he were to do a separate deal, this would damn him irretrievably in the eyes of every other Arab state.

8. In this connection, it is worth mentioning that when I was in Israel last week I was asked whether I thought that King Hussein would be willing to do a separate deal with the Israeli Government. I replied in exactly the same sense then, but it does seem strange that the same idea should have been put forward from two such totally different sources.

9. Mr. Amery's third point was that he felt that the present disorders in Iraq could lead to the overthrow of the present Government and that any alternative Government in Iraq must be an improvement on the present one. He suggested that Israel might be encouraged to supply arms and equipment to the opponents of the present régime in Baghdad. I replied that Israeli

/intelligence

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intelligence was such that, if there were any prospect of this, they would be quite capable of arranging it without any intervention from us and I felt that it was best that we kept well clear of any such idea. Mr. Amery then said that, if there were a change of régime in Baghdad, he hoped that we would make early attempts to get on good terms with them because he felt that Iraq was in a very important strategic position and if we could improve our relations there it would be of considerable help to us in regard to our problems in the Gulf.

10. From all this it is clear that Mr. Amery is anxious that we should play a more active part in the whole Middle East area. I tried to dampen down some of his enthusiasm but I urged him to keep in close touch with me because I would rather he should be putting his suggestions to me than airing them with other colleagues in the Smoking Room of the House of Commons.



(Joseph Godber)
10 November, 1970

Copies:

Permanent Under-Secretary
Sir P. Adams
Mr. Acland
Mr. Evans
Mr. Tesh

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BRITISH EMBASSY,

AMMAN.

13 November, 1970

(1/1)

Dem Richard,

NEJ 3/548/1

I paid my respects, on returning to Jordan, to King Hussein on 9 November. Apart from pressure from him for H.M.G. to reactivate our Aid Programme, and particularly the Amman Electricity project, as soon as possible (my telegram No. MODEV 222) there was nothing else worth telegraphing about.

2. After he had expressed his gratitude for our promptitude in responding to his requests for Relief and Medical Assistance, and had pressed me about the Amman Electricity Scheme and Aqaba Airport, I told the King that I was hopeful that we would resume most of our aid, but that I saw little prospect of our extending the scope and capacity of Aqaba Airport beyond what we had previously agreed to do. The King said that he would come back on this one in due course and we should probably be receiving an approach through the appropriate Ministry. In the changed circumstances since September, with the Syrians and Iraqis, not the Israelis, as Jordan's chief enemies, the military airfields at Mafraq and H4 were insecure, and he would prefer to have a military as well as civil airfield at Aqaba for all that the Israelis would be only a few hundred yards away. It would be chiefly a matter, he thought, of lengthening and strengthening runways.

3. The King pressed me again about the 105mm. HESH ammunition, and I explained to him the difficulty of getting any from us. He said he would raise the point with the Secretary of State when he visited London which he proposed to do immediately after Ramadan, about 28 or 29 November. He had not decided what, if any, other countries he would visit on this sortie.

/4. The King

R.M. Evans, Esq.,
Near Eastern Department,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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1971? 4. The King expressed himself confident that the public security situation in Amman was and would remain entirely satisfactory. There would probably be the odd incidents between individual Fedayeen and Security Forces for some time to come, but nothing in the least important. He hoped and believed that Irbid and the North West would likewise be clear of all trouble by mid-November. He saw no reason why expatriates should not therefore start returning thereafter. I said that public and parliamentary opinion at home was highly sensitive to British citizens being at unreasonable risk, and that my policy was bound to be cautious. But I did not wish to delay the arrival or return of expatriates who had useful jobs to do a moment longer than necessary. If all was quiet during the rest of this month and it appeared that the Fedayeen had carried out their side of the Cairo and Amman Agreements I should modify the advice I was giving on this subject.

5. Altogether the King was pretty relaxed and cheerful, and obviously thinks he has things pretty well under control again.

Yours ever

Bm.

(J.F.S. Phillips)

c.c. Sir Hugh Parry, C.B.E., M.E.D.D., Beirut
H.B. McKenzie Johnston, Esq., O.D.M., London
Chanceries:
Cairo
Tel Aviv
Beirut
Baghdad
Washington

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CONFIDENTIAL (i) Mr Evans

(ii) Enter into ref. *am* 23/4



BRITISH EMBASSY,

AMMAN. *25*

(1/1)

Consular Dept

should see, perhaps.

20 November, 1970

R.E. 26/11

Dear Christopher, (LAST PAPER)

14 — I have two minor comments to make on the otherwise admirably clear and concise Summary Record of the meeting we had in Philip Adams' office on 26 October to discuss the Political Future of Jordan and Anglo-Jordanian Relations.

2. First, if I said that I expected the Army command to return to Mashhur Haditha or someone like him it referred to a period some time ahead. Such an appointment is in my view unlikely in the near future, particularly while Wasfi Tel is Prime Minister.

3. Second, I did not say that no member of the British community had been injured; as reported in Amman telegram Distress 38 of 7 October, Miss Coate received a bullet wound in the leg. She is quite all right again now. *(attached)*

4. These are minor points but I thought I had better put the record straight.

*Yours sincerely
John Phillips*

(J.F.S. Phillips)

(LAST PAPER)

C.W. Long, Esq.,
Near Eastern Department,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office,
London, S.W.1.

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communication
Sub Arms/Philips
26 October.

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MY TEL NO DISTRESS 31. (161)

MISS COATE RECEIVED A FLESH WOUND IN THE RIGHT LEG FROM A BULLET ON 20 SEPTEMBER BUT DID NOT WISH HER SISTER TO BE INFORMED. AFTER SIX DAYS OF BEING LOOKED AFTER BY ARAB NEIGHBOURS SHE REACHED A MILITARY HOSPITAL. SHE IS NOW ABOUT AGAIN AT HOME AND IN VERY GOOD FORM.

2. SO FAR AS I KNOW MISS COATE WAS, IT SEEMS MIRACULOUSLY, THE ONLY BRITISH CASUALTY DURING THE RECENT FIGHTING.

MR. PHILLIPS

I have informed the
senior John Corder of this and
noted him to keep it to himself.
1115
187. 7/10

NNNN